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LITTLE LEOS AND THEIR LAUNCHERS
J. P. Schulz
Federal bureaucrats, much-maligned in today's
political climate, sometimes make decisions that ma-
terially enhance our individual lives.' These deci-
sions are perhaps nowhere more evident than within
the processes by which regulatory agencies open new
avenues for technological advance. An ongoing pro-
cess that fits this description well is the Federal
Communications Commission's ("FCC" or "Com-
mission") and other agencies' efforts to establish an
equitable set of rules that will permit competing tele-
communications companies to launch and operate
new satellite systems in low earth orbits. These are
known as LEO systems ("LEOs").
LEOs promise a wide range of communications
services that will be available to individuals and
businesses worldwide.' Technical developments, bus-
iness decisions, and corresponding rulemaking
processes are moving inexorably toward deployment
and operational stages.' Therefore, the communica-
tions lawyer should be aware not only of what LEO
systems are, but also of some of the existing domestic
and international laws that these systems bring into
play.
This Comment focuses on the proposed "Little
LEO" systems and the legal issues that their con-
struction, deployment, and operation raise. Part I de-
fines Little LEOs. Part II takes the reader through a
history of the FCC's involvement with Little LEO
system developments. Part III discusses the vehicles
necessary to deploy the systems. Finally, Part IV
analyzes the proposed systems in relation to the need
' A recently-published political cartoon highlights the popu-
lar sentiment and underscores the point. It depicts a homeown-
ing couple clinging for their lives to a piece of debris, afloat
above their flooded-to-the-rooftop property. A speedboat bearing
the letters F.E.M.A. motors toward them. One of the homeown-
ers waves frantically and says: "Thank Goodness! A Federal Bu-
reaucrat!!" Below the couple, prominently displayed in their
submerged front lawn, is a large sign that reads: "Get The Gov-
ernment Off Our Backs!' WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1995, at A25.
I See generally Rob Frieden, Satellites in the Wireless
Revolution: The Need for Realistic Perspectives, TELECOMMU-
NICATIONS, June 1994, at 33, 33.
3 See, e.g., Non-Voice, Non-Geostationary Mobile Satellite
for, and possible consequences of, international regu-
lation of the commercial development of space re-
sources. This Comment concludes that Little LEOs
present the FCC and other agencies with the first of
several practical models on which to base an interna-
tional legal regime for governing a broad range of
commercial activities in space.
I. LITTLE LEOS DEFINED
The term "Mobile Satellite Systems" ("MSS")
encompasses a number of emerging communications
technologies that will offer new services or will offer
established services in new ways.' Examples of these
services include portable telephones that can operate
from any location in the world' and digital audio ra-
dio programs that can deliver compact disc-quality
music that will not fade from a car's stereo system
during a long-distance drive.'
The satellites that will constitute the essential link
between the service provider and the end user will
orbit the Earth in one of four regions in space: 1) the
geostationary orbit ("GSO"), an extremely narrow
circular path in space that lies 22,300 miles above
the earth's surface and directly above the equator; 2)
mid-Earth orbits ("MEOs"), circular orbits approxi-
mately 5,000 to 10,000 miles above the surface of the
earth (not necessarily above the equator); 3) highly-
elliptical orbits ("HEOs"), specialized orbits on
which a satellite continuously swings very close to
the Earth, loops out into space and then repeats its
Service, Public Notice, 9 FCC Rcd. 695 (1994) [hereinafter
MSS Public Notice].
' Andrew C. Barrett & Byron F. Marchant, Emerging
Technologies and Personal Communications Services: Regula-
tory Issues, 1 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 3, 3 (1993).
' This is the goal of several of the Big LEO systems. See
infra materials accompanying note 11; see also Frieden, supra
note 3, at 34-35.
0 See Patrick Seitz, FCC To Hasten Licensing, SPACE
NEWS, Jan. 16-22, 1995, at 4, 4. The signals will not fade be-
cause satellite-based retransmission extends the broadcast cover-
age area to include the entire United States. Id.
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swing-by; and 4) circular low-Earth orbits
("LEOs")." LEOs range in altitude from approxi-
mately 100 to 1,000 miles above the earth's surface.'
The satellites that are designed to fly in low earth
orbits are also called LEOs.
The LEO systems currently under development
have been divided into two classifications: "Big
LEOs" and "Little LEOs."9 Systems in both classifi-
cations will be composed of multiple satellites.1
Big LEOs will operate at frequencies above one
Gigahertz ("GHz"), and will offer a full range of
both voice and data services.11 Little LEO systems,
by contrast, will operate at frequencies below 1
GHz, and are capable of transmitting data only. 2
Little LEOs will be able to deliver inexpensive
FAX, e-mail, and position-finding services to any
point on the globe.1
7 Martyn Warwick, An Embarrassment of Systems, COM-
MUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL, May 1994, at 51, 51.
' Id. While these conventional divisions of near-earth space
are widely accepted, specific labels and corresponding altitudes
will vary somewhat. See, e.g., HEATHER E. HUDSON, COMMU-
NICATION SATELLITES 5 (1990) (describing inter alia low earth
orbits as less than 300 miles above the earth). Each of these re-
gions provides unique advantages and drawbacks for the de-
signer, manufacturer, and/or operator of any given system.
Warwick, supra note 7, at 51. For example, the higher a satel-
lite flies, the larger its footprint can be. Id. (A footprint is a
satellite's area of coverage.) On the other hand, the higher a sat-
ellite flies, the farther its signals will have to travel, and there-
fore the more powerful, heavy, complex and expensive it will be
to manufacture, launch and maintain. Id.
I See Frieden, supra note 2, at 34.
10 Id.
" Id. Big LEOs promise global wireless communication net-
works that consumers can access using compact handsets. This
promise has attracted the attention of developing countries that
would like to obtain Plain Old Telephone Service (POTS) with-
out having to pay for and install the same vast ground-based
infrastructure that developed countries now use for conventional
service. For this and other reasons, Big LEOs have generated
substantial press attention. Probably the most well-known of the
Big LEO systems is the 66-satellite Iridium project. Iridium,
Inc., is an international consortium headed by Motorola, and is
currently slated to begin offering services in 1998. Id. See also
Patrick Seitz, Iridium Venture Sews Up Equity Financing,
SPACE NEWS, Sept. 26-Oct. 2, 1994, at 16. As of October, 1994,
Iridium had raised $1.57 billion in equity. Id. Other companies
that have applied to the FCC for Big LEO licenses include
Globalstar, L.P., TRW Inc., Mobile Communications Holdings
Inc., and Constellation Communications. Id. Other proposed
non-LEO systems that will offer services in direct competition
with the Big LEOs include a MEO system put forward by the
American Mobile Satellite Corp.; Teledesic, an 840 satellite con-
stellation backed by Microsoft Corp.'s Chairman Bill Gates; and
a commercial spin-off of the International Maritime Satellite
II. HISTORY OF THE PROPOSED
SYSTEMS
Conventional communication satellites make use
of the unique geostationary orbit ("GSO"). 1'4 A sat-
ellite in the GSO-and in no other orbit-will ap-
pear to remain motionless above a particular spot on
the globe.1 5 This unique feature of the GSO allows
ground-based transmitting and receiving antennas to
be aimed at (and fixed on) an unchanging location in
space. 6 Until recently, a spacecraft in any orbit
other than the GSO had to be tracked continuously
from the ground-a fact that required several
ground-based tracking stations to be positioned at
various points around the world.1 7 As a satellite rose
above the horizon and passed over a tracking station,
that station would "pick up the bird" and then, as
the satellite dipped below the horizon, "hand off" its
Organization (Inmarsat) called Project 21. Sandra Sugawara, A
Glut Around the Globe?, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 1994, at Dl.
See also Frieden, supra note 2, at 34.
1" Frieden, supra note 2, at 34. See also, In re Amendment
of the Commission's Rules to Establish Rules and Policies Per-
taining to a Non-Voice, Non-Geostationary Mobile-Satellite
Service, Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 8450, para. 2 (1993)
[hereinafter NVNG Report and Order]. In FCC nomenclature,
a Little LEO is a "Non-Voice, Non-Geostationary Mobile Sat-
ellite Service" ("NVNG MSS"). Id.
11 See Joseph Pelton, Will SmallSat Markets Be Large?
SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS, Feb. 1993, at 42, 42. Positioning
data may be used to help rescue teams locate emergency sites
quickly, or may be used in business to monitor the movements of
trucks, boats, planes, shipments or other assets. See Kathleen
Day, Orbital to Buy Positioning Firm, WASH. POST, Nov. 29,
1994, at C3.
14 See HUDSON, supra note 8, at 5.
15 Id. at 3. The GSO lies in the earth's equatorial plane at
the orbital altitude (or height above earth) where the velocity
necessary to keep a spacecraft in a circular orbit is exactly equal
to the earth's rotational velocity. Id. at 4-5. This means that a
satellite on the GSO circles the earth at exactly the same propor-
tional speed that a spot directly beneath it on the earth's equator
turns around the earth's axis of rotation (an imaginary line that
passes through the earth's north and south poles). Id. Thus,
from anywhere on the earth (whether north or south of the
equator), the satellite appears to be "standing still" in a fixed
position in space. Id. at 4-5, 246.
16 Id. at 246. The GSO also enables communications service
providers to achieve global coverage with as few as three satel-
lites. Id. at 3, 5. The physicist and science-fiction writer Arthur
C. Clarke first identified the GSO and its significance for tele-
communications. Id. at 2-4. He published his calculations in the
British radio journal Wireless World in 1945-more than a dec-
ade before the launch of Sputnik (the first artificial object ever to
achieve orbit around the earth). Id. The geostationary orbit is
sometimes referred to as the Clarke orbit. Id. at 4.
1 Id. at 246.
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tracking data to the next station.'" Advances in de-
fense-related switching technologies in the 1980s
made it possible for a satellite dipping below the ho-
rizon to "hand off" its signals to another satellite,
thus moving the "hand off" sequence from the
ground to space.19
A. First-Round Applicants
Once the technology became available for commer-
cial use, several companies representing both Big
and Little LEO interests announced their intentions
to build systems. Of the companies proposing Little
LEO systems, three filed applications with the FCC
during the first round of application acceptance: 0
the Orbital Communications Corporation
("Orbcomm"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Or-
bital Sciences Corporation of Dulles, Virginia;
STARSYS Global Positioning, Inc., of Lanham,
Maryland; and Volunteers in Technical Assistance
("VITA"), a non-profit medical information service
based in Arlington, VA.2 VITA initially proposed
to offer electronic packets of medical information,
transmitted via two low-Earth orbiting satellites, to
remote locations around the world."2 Because of the
18 Id. The cost of tracking antennas and the coordination be-
tween ground stations made non-geostationary systems much
more expensive, and thus less attractive, for commercial telecom-
munications providers than geostationary systems. Id.; see also
Dan Sweeney, Bird Watching: Megaplayers and Consortia are
Aligning Themselves to Compete for Satellite-based Mobile
Communications, CELLULAR BUSINESS, July 1993, at 23, 24.
19 Warwick, supra note 7, at 51. See also Sweeney, supra
note 18, at 28.
20 See NVNG Report and Order, supra note 12, para. 2.
The FCC dismissed a fourth application, Leosat's, on grounds
that the company had filed late. COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Jan.
29, 1993, at 9.
21 NVNG Report and Order, supra note 12, para. 2. See
also Patrick Seitz, FCC Deadline Stirs Up Satellite Ventures;
Little LEO Ranks Swell as Latest Round is Closed, SPACE
NEWS, Nov. 21-Dec. 4, 1994, at 4, 4.
" In re Request for Pioneer's Preference in Proceeding to
Allocate Spectrum for Fixed and Mobile Satellite Services for
Low-Earth Orbit Satellites, Tentative Decision, 7 FCC Rcd.
1625, paras. 3, 15 (1992) [hereinafter Request for Pioneer's
Preference].
22 Sweeney, supra note 18, at 26.
24 See Request for Pioneer's Preference, supra note 22, para.
3.
I8 d. "The Commission's pioneer's preference rules are in-
tended to provide a license preference to applicants that propose
an allocation for a new service, or a substantial enhancement to
an existing service." Id. para. 2. In response to Congressional
action regarding competitive bidding and the domestic imple-
mentation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"), the Commission is modifying its pioneer's prefer-
nature of VITA's announced system and the kinds of
information that it would handle, VITA was not ex-
pected to compete directly for a share of the same
for-profit niche in the telecommunications market
that Orbcomm and Starsys are vying for.2 3 These
latter two systems initially proposed constellations of
20- and 24-satellites, respectively. 2
VITA, Orbcomm and Starsys also applied to the
FCC for Pioneer Preference status.2 ' Although
Orbcomm and STARSYS did not oppose VITA's
petition, they argued against each other's petition.'
The FCC granted a Pioneer Preference to VITA in
January, 1993.27
In the wake of the system proposals, and at the
urging of the FCC, the International Telecommuni-
cations Union ("ITU") added spectrum allocation
for Little LEOs to the agenda of the 1992 World
Administrative Radio Conference ("WARC '92")."
In July, 1992, the FCC established a Negotiated
Rulemaking Committee and began to solicit com-
ments regarding technical sharing and coordination
issues pertaining to the establishment and regulation
of little LEOs.
2 9
The FCC Committee focused primarily on three
issues: 1) providing rapid and sustained availability
ence program and has proposed sunsetting the program on Sep-
tember 30, 1998. See Action in Docket Case-Modifications
Made in Pioneer's Preference Program; Rules Proposed in Re-
sponse to GATT Directives (ET Dkt. No. 93-266), FCC NEWS,
Mar. 1, 1995, at 1, 7.
26 Request for Pioneer's Preference, supra note 22, paras. 9,
11.
27 In re Amendment of Section 2.106 of the Commission's
Rules to Allocate Spectrum to the Fixed-Satellite Service and the
Mobile-Satellite Service for Low-Earth Orbit Satellites, Report
and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 1812, para. 1 (1993). The Commis-
sion's award was based on a preliminary finding that VITA was
the first to experiment with, and to develop, an inexpensive
scheme for LEO communications. Request for Pioneer's Prefer-
ence, supra note 22, paras. 15-16.
2" See Reed E. Hundt, Testimony Before the House Sub-
committee on Telecommunications on the Global Information
Infrastructure and the Role of Satellites, July 28, 1994, at 9 (on
file with the FCC). International spectrum allocation is one of
the primary functions of the WARC. Id. at 5-6. See generally
HUDSON, supra note 8, at 250-66. Spectrum allocation for the
second round applicants will be taken up at WARC '95. Patrick
Seitz, Companies Proposing Little LEO Systems Hit Roadblock,
SPACE NEWS, May 1-7, 1995, at 8.
29 Below 1 GHz Negotiated Rulemaking Advisory Commit-
tee, Notice of Advisory Committee Establishment, 57. Fed. Reg.
33,163 (1992). The FCC also initiated rulemaking for Big
LEOs. Hundt, supra note 28, at 25. The Big LEO rulemaking
process was not completed until October, 1994. See Patrick
Seitz, Final Rules Set for Big LEOs, SPACE NEWS, Oct. 17-23,
1994, at 3, 3.
1995]
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of Little LEO technologies to the U.S. consumer; 2)
ensuring competition among Little LEO applicants;
and 3) verifying that the applicants would be "able
to operate technically within the planned spectrum,
with room for additional entrants."30
The Commission announced preliminary rules in
January, 1993."' After obtaining further comments,
the Commission adopted a slightly-modified version
of the rules in October of the same year."2 The
adopted rules identify, inter alia, requirements for
obtaining permission to build both space-based and
ground-based components of little LEO systems, the
length of the license term (initially fixed at ten
years), renewal procedures, guidelines for system
construction milestones (i.e., setting completion dates
for major portions of the construction plan) and fre-
quency assignments."3
B. Competition in the First Round
In December, 1993, Orbcomm amended its appli-
cation to reflect an expansion of its proposed system
from twenty to thirty-six satellites.3 4 STARSYS vig-
orously objected to the planned expansion, claiming
that it was inconsistent with a previously-negotiated
agreement for sharing the limited Little LEO spec-
trum allocation.38
In March, 1994, VITA amended its application
when it entered into a construction agreement with
Rockville, Maryland-based CTA Space Systems.'
Both STARSYS and Orbcomm objected to the
80 Hundt, supra note 28, at 10. See also In re Amendment of
the Commission's Rules to Establish Rules and Policies Pertain-
ing to a Non-Voice, Non-Geostationary Mobile Satellite Service,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 8 FCC Rcd. 6330, paras. 2-6
(1993) [hereinafter '93 NPRM].
81 See '93 NPRM, supra note 30, para. 1.
88 NVNG Report and Order, supra note 12, para. 1.
88 Id. paras. 3-21.
a MSS Public Notice, supra note 3, at 695.
88 'They Doubled Size of System'. STARSYS: Amended
Orbcomm Application Conflicts With Prior Agreements, COM-
MUNICATIONS DAILY, Feb. 28, 1994, at 5, 5. The negotiated
plan for dividing the available spectrum between the three appli-
cants was called the "joint sharing agreement." Id.
" Technical Details Blurry; VITA Amends Little Leo Ap-
plication, Would Share Satellite With CTA, COMMUNICATIONS
DAILY, Apr. 29, 1994, at 4, 4.
7 Id. STARSYS also amended its application, requesting
launch and operating authority in addition to the construction
authority for which it initially applied. See In re Satellite Radio
Applications Accepted for Filing, Public Notice, (May 18,
1994), at 2, 2.
s 47 U.S.C.A. § 310 (West 1994). The statute reads, in
relevant part:
change on grounds that it altered VITA's commer-
cial profile and that it, too, threatened the joint shar-
ing agreement.
3 7
In addition to the objections raised concerning the
spectrum-sharing agreement, another issue provided
ammunition for battles between the competing sys-
tem builders. Pursuant to section 310 of the 1934
Communications Act, as amended ("1934 Act"), the
FCC may not grant a radio license to a foreign gov-
ernment or representative thereof, or to a corporation
that is directly or indirectly controlled by another
corporation having more than a twenty-five percent
foreign ownership. 8 Little LEO systems are aimed
at a global marketplace. They require technologies
that make them too expensive for a single firm to
afford without heavy infusions of outside capital.3 9
Moreover, foreign entities naturally want to acquire
some stake in promising ventures before allowing
those ventures to operate within their territories.
Both STARSYS and Orbcomm entered into busi-
ness relationships with foreign entities. In 1993,
Orbcomm entered into an eighty-million dollar joint
venture with the Canadian firm TeleGlobe.4 0 Struc-
turing the relationship as a joint venture allowed
Teleglobe to participate in the project while avoiding
the issue of foreign ownership. Nevertheless, STAR-
SYS accused Orbcomm of improperly reporting its
financial relationship with the Canadian firm to the
FCC.41 Orbcomm counterattacked, complaining that
STARSYS was foreign-government controlled. In
fact, STARSYS's ninety-five percent majority equity
holder is a company called STARGOS, S.A. 4'
(a). Grant to or holding by foreign government or
representative
The station license required under this chapter shall
not be granted to or held by any foreign government or
the representative thereof.
(b) Grant to or holding by alien or representative, foreign
corporation, etc.
No broadcast or common carrier . . . license shall be
granted to or held by-
(4) any corporation directly or indirectly controlled by
any other corporation ... of which more than one-fourth
of the capital stock is owned of record or voted by aliens,
their representatives, or by a foreign government or repre-
sentative thereof ....
8s Warwick, supra note 7, at 51.
40 See 'What We're Up Against', Bankers See Unstable U.S.
Policies as Adding to Risks of Commercial Space, COMMUNICA-
TIONS DAILY, Mar. 14, 1994, at 4, 4.
41 Id.
4' Non-Voice, Non-Geostationary Mobile-Satellite Service
Petition for Expedited Declaratory Ruling, Public Notice, 9
FCC Rcd. 1785, 1785 (1994).
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STARGOS is owned in part by CNES (the French
Space Agency) and other representatives of the
French government.4  Orbcomm's complaint
prompted STARSYS to petition the FCC for a de-
claratory ruling that would exempt it from the limi-
tations under section 310 of the 1934 Act."
Numerous government, trade, and popular press
reports have intensified the competition between lit-
tle LEO applicants. These reports share a common
motif: there is too much concentration of data trans-
mission technologies in the market for Little LEO
systems to survive.45 The reports cite technologies
that include existing cellular systems," transponder
leasing arrangements with geostationary satellite
owners, and the proposed Big LEO systems, which
will offer both voice and data services.'
7
C. The Second Round and Beyond
Despite the squabbling and the skeptics, the work
on Little LEO systems is proceeding apace. In Sep-
tember, 1994, the FCC initiated a second round of
application submissions." The Leo One USA Cor-
poration of St. Louis, Missouri, was the first to file
in the new round, applying for a license for a 48-
satellite Little LEO constellation.' 9 Four additional
companies also applied for licenses.50 GE Americom
of Princeton, New Jersey, plans a 24-satellite con-
stellation.5 ' Final Analysis Communications Services
of Greenbelt, Maryland, applied for a license for a
26-satellite constellation.5 ' And VITA's construction
partner CTA applied for a license for its own 36-
satellite GEMnet system.53 E-sat, the fourth second-




4 Id. STARSYS petitioned the FCC to rule that it was not
a common carrier. See COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Mar. 17,
1994, at 7.
45 See, e.g., Warwick, supra note 7; Sugawara, supra note
11; and Pelton, supra note 13.
46 In fact, LEOs and cellular systems are not mutually ex-
clusive: LEOs may be able to function as signal wholesalers to
the cellular retailers. For a discussion of the relationship be-
tween LEOs and cellular services, see Sweeney, supra note 18,
at 24.
47 See supra text accompanying note 11.
4" Wait For WARC '95?; Next Round of Little Leo Appli-
cants Will Have to Vie for Limited Spectrum, COMMUNICA-
TIONS DAILY, Sept. 29, 1994, at 2, 2.
' Satellite Application Acceptable for Filing, Public Notice,
9 FCC Rcd. 5261, 5261 (1994).
50 Seitz, Little LEO Ranks Swell, supra note 21, at 4, 28;
and see System Proponents Attack Competitors' 2nd-Round Lit-
tle LEO Applications, SATELLITE WEEK, Mar. 6, 1995, at 1, 1.
4' Seitz, supra note 21, at 28.
In October, 1994, the FCC issued the first Little
LEO license to Orbcomm." Orbcomm and VITA
are each seeking to expand their systems, and their
amended applications are also being considered in
the second round of licensing applications."
Assuming that the three first round applicants and
one or more second round applicants successfully
complete their licensing and development phases,
well over 100 small satellites ("smallsats" or "light-
sats") will have to be deployed in orbit. Following
initial deployment, each system will require periodic
replacement and/or maintenance flights. These sys-
tems' viability, therefore, is intrinsically related to
another technology-oriented industry: the commercial
launch vehicle industry.
III. ACCESS TO SPACE
Until the 1980s, commercial launches in the
United States were conducted exclusively by the gov-
ernment. 57 If AT&T, INTELSAT, or another com-
mercial telecommunications provider needed to
launch a satellite from the United States, the govern-
ment would contract with a launch vehicle provider,
and AT&T or INTELSAT then would purchase a
launch from the government. 8
The launch vehicle scene changed dramatically in
the late 1970s and 1980s. One of several significant
contributions to the change was the emergence of the
French Arianespace as a leading contender for a
large slice of the global commercial space launch
market. 9
In 1984, Congress passed the Commercial Space
Launch Act ("1984 Act") 60 in an effort to encourage
s Id.
53 Id.
System Proponents Attack, supra note 50, at 1.
55 In re Application of Orbital Communications Corporation
for Authority to Construct, Launch and Operate a Non-Voice,
Non-Geostationary Mobile Satellite System, 9 FCC Rcd. 6476,
para. 1 (1994). See also Patrick Seitz, Orbital Wins License for
Orbcomm Constellation, SPACE NEWS, Oct. 24-30, 1994, at 3,
21. At the time of this writing, Orbcomm is the only Little LEO
system to have been granted a license.
6 Seitz, Little LEO Ranks Swell, supra note 21, at 4, 4.
57 Commercial Space Transportation; Licensing Regula-
tions, 53 Fed. Reg. 11,004, 11,004-05 (1988).
Be Id.
51 The Ariane launch system is backed by the fourteen
member-nations of the European Space Agency ("ESA"). For a
history of the ESA and Ariane, see DAvID BAKER, CONQUEST,
89-92 (1984). Ariane now accounts for about 60% of the global
launch market. Peter B. de Selding, Proton Pricing Spurs More
Complaints, SPACE NEWS, Jan. 9-15, 1994, at 1, 1.
Be 49 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (1994) (repealed 1994; recodi-
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the growing domestic commercial launch industry.01
Pursuant to the 1984 Act, the Department of Trans-
portation's Office of Commercial Space Transporta-
tion ("OCST") assumed licensing authority for com-
mercial launches. 62
On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Chal-
lenger exploded over the Atlantic, seventy-three
seconds into its tenth flight."3 The Reagan Adminis-
tration responded to the tragedy by, inter alia,
prohibiting NASA from using the shuttle fleet for
routine commercial launches unless there was a spe-
cific need to do so."' The grounding of the shuttles
and the ensuing prohibition on shuttle-borne com-
mercial satellite launches had the immediate effect of
stimulating the nascent commercial launch industry
as companies sought other means of getting their
satellites into orbit.66
The prohibition also contributed to the develop-
ment of Little LEO systems. The Orbital Sciences
Corporation (Orbcomm's parent company) had won
its first major NASA contract for an "upper stage"
fled generally in 49 U.S.C., Subtitle IX-Commercial Space
Transportation, ch. 701, Commercial Space Launch Activities,
49 U.S.C. §§ 70101-70119 (1994)).
61 Office of Commercial Space Transportation, Notice of
Public Meeting, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,020, 52,020 (1994).
6" Commercial Space Transportation, supra note 57, at
11,004.
"8 PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SPACE SHUTTLE
CHALLENGER ACCIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 6, 19
(1986).
04 Commercial Space Transportation, supra note 57, at
11,004.
65 Id.
11 See NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRA-
TION, SPACE SHUTTLE MISSION STS-51 PRESS KIT, 17-20
(1993). An "upper stage" is used to boost a "payload," the ob-
ject that a launch vehicle carries into space, from the highest
point that the vehicles' main boosting engines can carry it (usu-
ally to low earth orbit) to its "destination orbit" (e.g., a higher
orbit, a translunar or an interplanetary trajectory, or, in the case
of traditional communications satellites, the GSO). Id.
67 Id. at 17. The TOS was built by Martin Marietta under
contract to Orbital. Id. Its first mission was to boost a spacecraft
called Mars Observer from earth orbit into an interplanetary
trajectory toward the Red Planet. Id. Mars Observer was the
first U.S. mission to Mars since the Viking lander missions in
the 1970s. See James T. McKenna, U.S. Probe Begins Journey
to Mars, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 5, 1992, at 22,
22-4. The TOS and Mars Observer were launched atop a Mar-
tin Marietta Commercial Titan (Titan III) rocket in October,
1992. Id. The TOS performed its role successfully, but after an
eleven-month journey, the Mars Observer spacecraft went awry
as it was being readied to enter Mars orbit. See James R. Asker,
Panels Cite Many Faults in Mars Observer, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Jan. 10, 1994, at 25, 25-27. The TOS made its
first shuttle flight in 1993 as the upper stage for NASA's Ad-
vanced Communications Technology Satellite ("ACTS"). STS-
booster called the Transfer Orbit Stage ("TOS"). e
Orbital intended to use the TOS to carry shuttle-
deployed satellites from low earth orbit to their final
destinations in space." Confronted with the prohibi-
tion against shuttle-borne commercial satellite
launches, Orbital turned its attention to the small
launch vehicle market. In 1988, Orbital announced
its intention to build and market the Pegasus air-
launched winged rocket. 8
The Pegasus made its first flight in April, 1990.'
In February, 1993, a Pegasus launched Brazil's first
satellite, the Satelita de Coletos de Dados do Brasil
("SCDI").' 0 The SCD1 was designed to aid the
Brazilian government in monitoring the Amazon Ba-
sin."' The flight also carried a small test satellite, or
"pathfinder," for Orbcomm. 7 2
Not all of the Pegasus flights have been successful.
In May, 1994, a Pegasus delivered a military satel-
lite to an unplanned orbit.7 1 In June, 1994, Orbital's
new Pegasus XL malfunctioned shortly after launch
and had to be destroyed in flight.7 In addition to the
51 PRESS KIT, supra note 66, at 17.
" See Craig Covault, Commercial Winged Booster to
Launch Satellites From B-52, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
June 6, 1988, at 14, 14-16. The Pegasus is designed to be
launched from the underside of a carrier aircraft-early flights
used a modified B-52 bomber aircraft belonging to NASA. Id.
The rocket is "dropped" at an altitude of approximately 40,000
feet. Id. Its large triangular-shaped wing gives it stability and
aerodynamic lift as its main rocket motor fires and drives it up-
ward toward space. Id. The wing and spent motor separate from
the remaining stages and fall away as successive stages fire. Id.
Orbital now uses a modified Lockheed L-1011 aircraft to carry
the Pegasus aloft. See Bruce A. Smith, OSC Seeks Cause of Peg-
asus XL Failure, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., July 4, 1994,
at 30, 30.
0' See Bruce A. Smith, Pegasus Booster Proves to be Highly
Accurate in its First Launch, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Apr. 16, 1990, at 24, 24-25.
70 See Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, Pegasus Lofts Brazil's SCDI,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 15, 1993, at 64, 64-65.
71 Id.
72 Id.; see also NTSB Cites Confusion in Pegasus Launch
Room, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., June 21, 1993, at 62,
62.
71 See Bruce A. Smith, Pegasus-Launched STEP-2 in
Lower Than Expected Orbit, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
May 30, 1994, at 30, 30. The planned orbit was a circular, 450-
nautical mile orbit with an 82-degree inclination. However, the
spacecraft wound up in an elliptical, 325- by 443-nautical mile
orbit with an inclination of 81.95 degrees. Id. The unexpected
orbit did not damage the spacecraft, but it resulted in some deg-
radation of mission objectives. Id.
"' Smith, supra note 68, at 30. Range officials determined
that the vehicle was losing altitude, and they sent a destruct




Pegasus, Orbital has developed a larger, more pow-
erful, pad-launched rocket called Taurus. 5
Orbital's rockets are not the only contenders for a
share of the small launch vehicle market. Lockheed
Missiles & Space of Calabassas, California, is a for-
midable competitor. Lockheed recently completed a
merger with Martin Marietta of Bethesda, Mary-
land. The merger has made the new Lockheed Mar-
tin company arguably the world's largest aerospace
firm." Lockheed Martin is offering a series of
"Lockheed Launch Vehicles" ("LLVs") that are in-




Lockheed Martin is also involved in a joint ven-
ture with two Russian rocket builders, Khrunichev
State Research and Production Space Center
("Khrunichev") and RKK Energia.7 8 The Lock-
heed-Khrunichev-Energia consortium ("LKE")
plans to market Proton rockets to western custom-
ers.71 One of its customers may be second-round Lit-
tle LEO applicant Final Analysis, which plans to
use the Proton to launch its FAIsat system.80
Two other contenders for a share of the small
launch vehicle market are the American Rocket
Company ("AMROC")81  and Sea Launch.82
AMROC has developed a hybrid rocket motor that
combines features of both solid and liquid rocket mo-
tors in the same propulsion system." Sea Launch is
11 See Craig Covault, Pegasus, MX Boosters Combined for
New Defense Launch Vehicle, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Sept. 18, 1989, at 47, 47.
" See Viveca Novak & Jeff Cole, Lockheed-Marietta Ap-
proval Hailed by Defense Analysts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1995,
at B10. See also Patrick Seitz, Lockheed Martin Corp. Officials
Ready Ax, SPACE NEWS, Mar. 20-26, 1995, at 6.
" See Special Report: Small Launch Vehicles Pivotal to
LEO Systems, MOBILE SATELLITE NEWS, Sept. 29, 1993, at 4,
5. One of VITA's Little LEO satellites, built by second-round
applicant CTA, will fly on the first launch of a Lockheed LLV,
currently set for the second quarter of 1995. Remaining LLV
Hardware to be Sent to Vandenberg, SPACE NEWS, Feb. 13-19,
1995, at 12.
78 de Selding, supra note 59, at 20.
7 Id. Khrunichev has agreed to launch some of the satellites
that will make up the Big LEO Iridium system. 'It's Within 15-
20%': Transportation Dept. Makes Conservative Estimates On
Leo Satellite Launches, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Apr. 18,
1994, at 4. Other Iridium launchers include McDonnell Doug-
las (forty satellites on eight Delta rockets) and China Great
Wall. Id. China Great Wall Industries Corporation produces the
Long March rocket. See Patrick Seitz, Insurers Wary of Chinese
Rocket, SPACE NEWS, Feb. 13-19, 1995, at 1, 1.
80 See Wait for WARC '95? Next Round of Little Leo Ap-
plicants Will Have to Vie for Limited Spectrum, COMMUNICA-
TIONS DAILY, Sept. 29, 1994, at 2, 3. Final Analysis launched
its first Little LEO satellite, FAIsat-1, on a Russian Cosmos
an international joint venture led by the Boeing
Company and includes Russian, Ukrainian and
Norwegian partners." Sea Launch plans to launch
Russian Zenit boosters from a converted oil platform
in the Pacific.8
Finally, the Clinton Administration's National
Space Transportation Policy, released by the Office
of Science and Technology in August, 1994,8" pro-
vides another source of competition. The policy per-
mits the use of excess ballistic missile assets for space
launches, subject to several conditions.
87
The market for small launch vehicles, like the
market for the Little LEO systems they will deploy,
is uncertain. In April, 1994, the Transportation De-
partment's Office of Commercial Space Transporta-
tion ("OCST") released a report estimating that
only one of the proposed Little LEO systems will
make it to orbit.8 ' Evaluating several scenarios, the
report predicts that only eight to twelve small
launches per year will be required between 1994 and
2005.89
Whether or not the Transportation department's
predictions are accurate remains to be seen. Mean-
while, the Orbital Sciences Corporation appears to
be taking steps to ensure a dominant position in both
the LEO and launch vehicle markets. In August,
1994, Orbital acquired a stake in the Big LEO com-
petition when it bought Fairchild Space and Defense
rocket in January, 1995. See James A. Asker, ed., In Orbit,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 27, 1995, at 57.
81 Amroc Set To Re-enter Small Launcher Market, SPACE
NEWS, Jan. 23-29, 1995, at 2.
8" Small Launch Vehicles, supra note 77, at 5.
8s Id. For background on AMROC's hybrid program, see
Michael A. Dornheim, Amroc Hybrid Motor Tests Aimed at
1995 Flight, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 1, 1993, at
51.
" Warren Ferster, Sea Launch Seeks Exemption From U.S.
Quotas, SPACE NEWS, May 8-14, 1995, at 1, 1.
85 Id.
8' OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, THE
WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION POLICY
(1994).
87 Id. at 7. "Excess ballistic missile assets" are the ICBM
boosters that are to be eliminated under the Strategic Arms Re-
duction Talks ("START") agreements. Id. The policy applies
only to government agencies, which are required to purchase
launch vehicles and services commercially "to the fullest extent
feasible." Id. The agency seeking to use the surplus must "cer-
tify the use of excess ballistic missile assets results in a cost sav-
ing to the U.S. Government relative to the use of available com-
mercial launch services .... " Id.
s8 'It's Within 15-20%': Transportation Dept. Makes Con-
servative Estimates On Leo Satellite Launches, COMMUNICA-




Corporation of Germantown, Maryland.9 0 Fairchild
is building the Ellipsat Big LEO system. 1 In De-
cember, 1994, Orbital bought Magellan Corpora-
tion, a manufacturer of hand-held navigation receiv-
ers.9 2 With the purchase of Magellan, Orbital has
consolidated control over virtually every aspect of the
Orbcomm system.9
On April 3, 1995, a Pegasus delivered the first
two Orbcomm satellites to LEO."' Both satellites
subsequently developed problems with their space-
to-ground communications subsystems. 5 As of mid-
May, 1995, one satellite had been repaired, and the
second was expected to be repaired within several
weeks. 6 Orbcomm hopes to offer initial services in
mid-1995.97
IV. FORGING A LEGAL REGIME FOR THE
FUTURE
The foregoing discussions of Little LEO systems
and their related launch technologies involve a broad
range of domestic and international entities, both
public and private: the FCC; the ITU; the Depart-
ment of Transportation; NASA; Congress and the
White House; aerospace giants and start-ups; a Ca-
nadian firm; the French government; and Russian
90 See Patrick Seitz, OSC Nets Magellan Corp. in $50 Mil-
lion Stock Transition, SPACE NEWS, Dec. 5-11, 1994, at 19.
01 Big/Little LEO Player; Orbital Sciences to Buy Fairchild
Space & Defense for $95 Million, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY,
June 2, 1994, at 2. Ellipsat is owned by Mobile Communica-
tions Holdings, Inc., of Washington, DC ("MCHI"). Frieden,
supra note 2, at 34 (referring to the Ellipsat system as "Elipso I
and II"). The FCC denied MCHI's application for a license
when it issued the first of the Big LEO licenses in late January,
1995. John Mintz, FCC Grants 3 Satellite Licenses, Denies
Them to 2 Local Firms, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1995, at F3. The
FCC granted licenses to Big LEO applicants Motorola (Irid-
ium), TRW (Odyssey), and Loral/Qualcomm (Globalstar). Id.
MCHI appealed the FCC's decision, and now has until Janu-
ary, 1996, to file an amended application. Firm Asks FCC To
Reconsider, SPACE NEWS, Mar. 13-19, 1995, at 32.
"' Seitz, supra note 90.
93 Id.
" Patrick Seitz, Receiver Glitch on Orbcomm 2 Threatens
Plans, SPACE NEWS, Apr. 10-16, 1995, at 3, 3.
11 News Breaks, AvIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 24,
1995, at 17.
9' Kara Swisher, Orbital Sciences Says It Has Fixed One
Satellite, WASH. POST, May 16, 1995, at E3.
7 Id. The system's remaining twenty-four satellites will be
launched in groups of eight on three Pegasus XL rockets. Pat-
rick Seitz, Orbcomm Anxious To Begin Its New Business,
SPACE NEWS, Mar. 6-12, 1995, at 3, 3.
00 See, e.g., Stephen E. Doyle, International Space Plans
and Policies: Future Roles of International Organizations, 18 J.
rocket-builders. The list is by no means complete.98
The reasons for the broad range of interested enti-
ties are clear: these systems are global, and the world
is (still) a very big place. Space is even bigger, and
activities in space have been, and continue to be, a
subject of intense international interest. 99
The international components of the Little LEO
system builders' activities are largely matters of pri-
vate international law; however, Little LEOs also
impinge on several aspects of public international
law. Their activities touch on questions of possible
future international management of a broad range of
in-space activities.
A. Relevant Treaties
Early efforts to create an international framework
for regulating space activities resulted in the 1967
Outer Space Treaty. 00 The Outer Space Treaty is
sometimes referred to as the "Principles Treaty," a
term that reflects its importance as the basis for sub-
sequent agreements. 01
Two of these agreements have a direct bearing on
any organization that plans to launch objects into
space: the Registration Convention102 and the Liabil-
ity Convention.' The Registration Convention re-
SPACE L. 123-37 (1990). The article lists more than 60 national,
regional, and global organizations having direct involvement in
space activities. Id.
00 See, e.g., Rick R. Dobson, Creating an International
Agency, SPACE NEWS, Nov. 21-Dec. 4, 1994, at 19 (commentary
calling for the creation of an International Space Agency that
consists of elements of the United Nations and the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT)). See
generally HUDSON, supra note 8, at 246-66 (discussing the ori-
gins and role of the International Telecommunication Union
("ITU") and international regulation of access to the geostation-
ary orbit).
100 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410
[hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. The treaty "address[ed] virtu-
ally all space activities and creat[ed] a framework for future ne-
gotiations of outer space issues." BARRY E. CARTER AND PHIL-
LIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1112 (1991). More
than 95 nations, including the United States, are parties to this
treaty. Id.
101 See Grier C. Raclin, From Ice To Ether: The Adoption
of a Regime to Govern Resource Exploitation in Outer Space, 7
Nw. J. INT'L. L. & BUS. 727, 731-33 (1986).
"" Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into
Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, T.I.A.S. 8467 [hereinafter Registra-
tion Convention].
,' Convention on International Liability for Damage




quires states to register spacecraft launched from
their territories with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations.1 0 4 The Liability Convention holds a
launching state absolutely liable for damage that its
spacecraft cause, either on the ground or to aircraft
in flight. 05 Liability for damage caused to another
spacecraft is fault-based. 06 Because the United
States government would be held liable for damage
caused by spacecraft launched from its territory,
companies seeking a license to launch from the
United States must take steps to minimize the gov-
ernment's exposure. To do this, companies must
enter into cross-waivers of liability with "contractors,
subcontractors, and customers, and contractors and
subcontractors of the customers. "107 Additionally,
companies must provide insurance up to a statutory
maximum of $500,000,000.10' The government will
provide indemnification for amounts above a com-
pany's level of insurance, provided the difference is
not more than $1.5 billion. 09
The Registration and Liability Conventions are
two documents that reflect an acceptance of the prin-
ciples set forth in the Outer Space Treaty. However,
104 Registration Convention, supra note 102, arts. III, IV.
101 Liability Convention, supra note 103, art. II. A "launch-
ing State" is defined as a State that either launches or procures a
launch, or a State "from whose territory or facility a space object
is launched." Id. art. I. A "space object" includes its launch ve-
hicle. Id. If a launch is carried out by more than one launching
State (i.e., if State A launches State B's satellite, which carries
State C's components), all of the launching States are jointly and
severally liable "for any damage caused." Id. art. V.
100 Id. art. III.
107 49 U.S.C. § 70112 (1994). A cross-waiver of liability,
also called a "reciprocal waiver of claims," is an agreement be-
tween parties that each will assume responsibility for its own
losses, and will not assert claims against the other party or par-
ties. Id.
108 Id.
109 49 U.S.C. § 70113 (1994).
110 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 100, art. II (stating that
"Outer Space ... is not subject to national appropriation by
claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any
other means").
III The Bogota Declaration [1976], pt. 1, reprinted in
CARTER AND TRIMBLE, supra note 100, at 1136, 1137. The seg-
ments claimed are those that lie directly above the territorial
boundaries of the signatory nations. Id.
112 Id. The finite nature of the orbit-spectrum resource (i.e.,
the number of available "slots" on the geostationary orbit) is
widely recognized. See HUDSON, supra note 8, at 247.
118 Bogota Declaration, supra note 111, pt. 1 at 1137. Al-
though the Bogota Declaration has never gained wide accept-
ance, the concern continues to resurface in various contexts. See,
e.g., Patrick Seitz, Crowding of Communications Satellites
Causing Problems, SPACE NEWS, Oct. 3-9, 1994, at 18. One ap-
proach to the problem stirred considerable controversy when the
another international document rejects one of the
Outer Space Treaty's central principles: the princi-
ple that no nation may make a claim of sovereignty
over outer space or the natural objects within it.' 10
The Bogota Declaration, signed by eight equatorial
nations in 1976, asserts on behalf of its signatories a
claim of sovereignty over segments of the geostation-
ary orbit."' The Bogota Declaration describes the
GSO as a scarce natural resource.1 ' Its claim re-
flects concern that equatorial nations, currently lack-
ing the economic or technical ability to place satel-
lites on the GSO, will be unable to use that orbit in
the future because the GSO will become "saturated"
with satellites owned by industrialized nations. "
Other (non-equatorial) developing nations have
expressed concerns similar to those found in the Bo-
gota Declaration. Many of these concerns are re-
flected in the 1979 Moon Treaty, which also traces
its origins to the Outer Space Treaty.' 1 4 The Moon
Treaty declares space resources to be the "Common
Heritage of Mankind" ' 5 and calls for the creation
of an "international regime" to manage their acqui-
sition and use.'
tiny Pacific island of Tonga petitioned the ITU for slots on the
geostationary orbit and, once granted, promptly began to sell
them. Id.; see also Jonathan Ira Ezor, Costs Overhead: Tonga's
Claiming of Sixteen Geostationary Orbital Sites and the Impli-
cations for US. Space Policy, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 915,
915-16 (1993).
114 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, U.N. Doc. A/
34/664 [hereinafter Moon Treaty].
... Moon Treaty, supra note 114, art. 11, para. 1 ("The
moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of man-
kind.. . "). The "common heritage of mankind" language also
links the Moon Treaty's provisions for the future utilization of
space resources with the Deep Seabed Mining Provisions of the
1982 Law of the Sea Treaty. United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 136, 21 I.L.M. 1261 [here-
inafter Law of the Sea Treaty]. For background on the "com-
mon heritage of mankind" and its relation to the U.S.'s objec-
tions to both the Moon Treaty and the Law of the Sea Treaty,
see Raclin, supra note 101, at 737. See also S. Treaty Doc. No.
39, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., at 60, 60-61 (1994) (discussing the
Agreement on the Implementation of Part XI of the Law of the
Sea Treaty (the Deep Seabed Mining Provisions), signed in
New York on July 29, 1994). The Law of the Sea Treaty en-
tered into force on November 16, 1994. Id.
"' Moon Treaty, supra note 114, art. 11, paras. 5, 7. Cf.
Law of the Sea Treaty, supra note 115, pt. XI, § 4 (establishing
an Authority to manage the acquisition and use of deep seabed
resources). The United States is not a party to the Moon Treaty.
Raclin, supra note 101, at 735, 738. The Moon Treaty required
only five signatures to bring it into force, Moon Treaty, supra
note 114, art. 19, para. 3, and has been in force since July 11,
1984. See Ezor, supra note 113, at 929. It was to have been
reviewed at a meeting of the United Nations Committee on
1995]
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
B. Little LEOs as a Practical Model
Any proposed international regime for the man-
agement of space resource acquisition and use should
be tested against a real-world example of precisely
what "acquisition" entails. The companies involved
in creating Little LEO technologies provide such a
model. They represent an emerging industry that is
based on access to, and use of, space resources (i.e.,
low earth orbital positions) that must be shared with
other users. 1 Little LEO system builders' concrete
interests in the acquisition and development of space
resources have already taken a nascent form in the
satellites they are constructing and in the regulatory
waters they are navigating. As noted at the begin-
ning of Part IV of this Comment, those systems
touch a broad range of existing areas of domestic and
international law. The issues that Little LEOs and
their launchers bring before lawmaking bodies are
practical, not theoretical.
C. Defining the Model
If Little LEO systems are to serve as a model in
the development of an international regulatory
scheme, the features of the model must be defined.
Three characteristics of the Little LEO model are
worth noting especially.
First, although the model touches a broad range of
existing legal entities, it is composed of a discrete set
of interests. It does not span the entire telecommuni-
cations or satellite-building industries. Rather, the
model currently is limited to a handful of companies
using innovative technologies to explore non-voice
non-geostationary satellite communications. Because
the number of companies is small and the field of
interest is narrow, the model is relatively easy to
view and evaluate as a whole. Thus, it is a managea-
ble model.
Second, although communications satellites have
existed for three decades, and a United States com-
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ("UN COPUOS") in 1994. See
Moon Treaty, supra note 114, art. 18. See also Round-up of
Session, Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Press Re-
lease (no number in original), Jun. 17, 1994, at 4. The UN
COPUOS declined to take further action at that meeting. Id. To
date, the Moon Treaty has been ratified by only nine states,
with five additional unratified signatures. Id.
11 Other users include earth-imaging systems ("remote
sensing") such as the U.S. Landsat and the French SPOT Image
spacecraft, space materials processing interests, and human
spaceflight programs. See, e.g., J. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 171-173 (1984), reprinted in CARTER
AND TRIMBLE, supra note 100, at 1110 (citing examples of the
mercial launch industry has existed since the early
1980s, the Little LEO model is a unique blend of
the two industries. This factor is significant because
the consolidation of the two industries' interests is
likely to lead to greater economic interdependence
between project originators and access providers.' 18
A close nexus between system designers and access
providers will likely give rise to a greater range of
innovative in-space endeavors.
Third, some of the key participants in the Little
LEO industry have interests that extend well beyond
telecommunications. CTA, for example, in addition
to its Little LEO involvements, also is involved in
remote sensing."" Orbital Sciences and Martin
Marietta provided the TOS upper stage booster for a
mission to Mars. The new Lockheed Martin Corpo-
ration is one of the largest aerospace companies in
the world, with a commensurately large range of
interests.
This "broader interest" factor is perhaps the
model's most significant aspect. If a government or
an, international consortium of large corporations
were to embark on a non-telecommunications-related
project (e.g., the construction of a human-tended
microgravity materials processing facility), it is un-
likely that a telecommunications-only firm would
play more than a "communications-only" role in the
venture. Orbital Sciences or Lockheed Martin, on
the other hand, likely would be among the first com-
panies approached by, or the first to submit bids to,
an entity seeking a supplier of major components for
the project.
In summary, Little LEO system builders embody
three important characteristics that provide a useful
model for international space resource acquisition
and development: 1) a discrete field of current play-
ers; 2) a close nexus between launch vehicles and
system design; and 3) the potential for an expanded
range of in-space developments beyond the field of
telecommunications.
constantly increasing scale of expansion of space technologies
and interests).
"' "Every spacecraft manufacturer builds spacecraft to fit
existing launch vehicles. So whatever exists, people will be
building to that size. I know that Lockheed studied the market
and decided to go for something larger than Pegasus, more of the
Taurus size, because the cost per pound [to orbit] is less." Pat-
rick Seitz, Newsmaker Forum (Interview with George
Sebestyen, President, CTA Space Systems), SPACE NEWS, Oct.
17-23, 1994, at 22.
'1 See Ben Tannotta, Lockheed Launcher May Boost Both
Lewis, Clark, SPACE NEWS, Nov. 14-20, 1994, at 1, 1.
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D. Applying the Model
United States government entities, such as the De-
partments of Transportation, State, and Defense, as
well as independent agencies, such as NASA and the
FCC, already are involved in ensuring Little LEO
compliance with a number of international treaties.
Representatives of these organizations work directly
or indirectly with representatives of non-U.S. organi-
zations such as the International Telecommunica-
tions Union ("ITU"), the World Administrative Ra-
dio Conference ("WARC"), and the United Nations
Committee On Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ("UN
COPUOS"). Patterns of interaction between these
U.S. and non-U.S. entities are well-established, and
their participants have years of accumulated practi-
cal experience within their respective organizations'
interests.
If an international regime is required to manage
the future acquisition and utilization of space re-
sources, the model can be used to trace the working
relationships that have already been called upon to
establish and regulate the present Little LEO indus-
try. Tracing the relationships would highlight the
primary elements-and perhaps some of the person-
nel-necessary to such a regime, and would make it
possible to bring all existing necessary expertise
under one roof in the regime's creation.
Little LEO system builders, by the accident of
having been first to obtain licensing approval for
their construction and launch programs, have pro-
vided a prototypical regulatory model for future
commercial activities in space. Other models will
surely follow, but all practical models are invaluable
for future planning. Therefore, where the Little
LEO model can be used in international space plan-
ning, it should be used.
V. CONCLUSION
Little LEO satellite systems are innovative, pri-
vate sector communications technologies aimed at the
global marketplace. Their novel approach to commu-
nication products and services demands equally novel
regulatory solutions to the public domestic and inter-
national issues that their financing, construction, and
operations present. The fledgling commercial launch
industry that will install these systems on orbit also
requires new rules and regulations, incorporating a
broad range of government entities. Taken together,
the Little LEO systems and their prospective launch
vehicle suppliers represent the emergence of an in-
dustry that seeks the private acquisition and use of
orbital space resources.
Proposals for the international management of
space resources continue to receive serious considera-
tion. Little LEO system-builders provide a "real
world" model for interagency and intergovernmental
coordination. They can and should be used to evalu-
ate any international management plan.
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